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Summary 
Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) and high-deductible health 
plans (HDHPs) feature prominently in many discussions of 
health reform. 
In the context of proposals from the Obama •	
administration and Congress, they will be of continuing 
interest as minimum benefit standards and insurance 
options under broad-based reform are discussed. 
While supporters hope they will make individuals more •	
prudent purchasers of medical care, the tax structure 
and incentives built into HSAs make them most attractive 
to the high-income and the healthy, populations already 
advantaged by the current system. 
Tax Advantages of HSAs  
HSAs provide a generous tax incentive for certain •	
individuals to seek out HDHPs with IRS-defined 
characteristics. Individuals buying qualified HDHPs 
either through their employer or in the private nongroup 
insurance market can make tax-deductible contributions 
into an HSA. 
Funds deposited into the accounts are deducted from •	
income for tax purposes, and any earnings on the funds 
accrue tax free and are not subject to tax or penalty as 
long as they are withdrawn to cover medical costs. 
HSAs in Practice  
HSAs are intended to encourage more cost-conscious •	
spending by placing more of the health care financing 
burden on out-of-pocket spending by the users of services, 
as opposed to having services incorporated in the pre-
mium component of insurance coverage, which is shared 
equally across all enrollees regardless of service use. 
Average in-network deductibles for employees enrolled in •	
their employers’ HDHP/HSA plans are substantially higher 
than the IRS minimum for qualifying HDHPs. 
Roughly half of those with HSA-compatible policies do •	
not open HSAs, despite the tax advantages, and two-
thirds of employers report making no contribution to the 
HSAs of their workers. As a consequence, low-income or 
high health-care-need workers with these plans are likely 
to be exposed to much larger out-of-pocket financial bur-
dens than they would be under a comprehensive policy. 
What Makes HSAs Attractive?
The tax subsidy provided for HSA participants is greatest •	
for those in the highest marginal tax bracket and is of 
little or no value to those who do not owe income tax.  
Those who do not expect to have much in the way of •	
health expenses will be attracted to HSAs by the ability to 
accrue funds tax free.  
The Cost Containment Implications of 
the Health Care Spending Distribution
A small percentage of the population accounts for a •	
large share of total health care spending, so significantly 
decreasing health care spending will require substantially 
lowering the spending associated with high users of 
medical services. However, the high–deductible/HSA plan 
approach is not well designed for lowering the spending 
of the high-cost population in a manner that does not 
negatively affect their health. To compound the problem, 
there are no provisions to help these patients choose the 
services most important to their health.
The cost-containment potential of HSAs/HDHPs and their •	
implications for health outcomes vary considerably by the 
income of the enrollee.  
Implications of HSAs for the High 
Medical Need Population
By providing incentives for healthy individuals and •	
groups to purchase HSA-compatible plans, the average 
cost of those left in the traditional comprehensive plans 
may increase so much that maintaining that type of 
coverage is no longer financially viable. Thus, increasing 
enrollment in HDHP/HSA plans could actually decrease 
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Introduction
Health savings accounts (HSAs) and the 
high-deductible health plans associated 
with them continue to garner interest 
in both the public and private sectors 
for their purported potential to rein 
in health care spending. Fifty-four 
bills in the 110th Congress related to 
HSAs, Senator John McCain proposed 
expanding HSAs during the 2008 
presidential campaign, and some 
public health insurance programs have 
now introduced high-deductible/HSA 
plans for elderly and very low income 
people. High-deductible/HSA-like 
plans for Medicare enrollees, called 
“Medicare Medical Savings Account” 
plans, are now available to nearly all 
Medicare-eligible individuals.1 “Health 
Opportunity Account” plans, authorized 
under the federal Deficit Reduction Act 
(DRA) of 2005, are high-deductible/HSA 
plans currently being evaluated as an 
option for low-income individuals and 
families enrolled in some state Medicaid 
programs.2 However, HSAs first arose 
in the private sector, which is still the 
primary marketplace for these products 
and the focus of most HSA-related policy 
proposals. As the Obama administration 
and Congress discuss minimum benefit 
standards and insurance options during 
the coming years, the role of HSAs is 
certain to be of continuing interest. 
Background
Between 2000 and 2006, employer-
based health insurance premiums 
grew by 86 percent, compared with 20 
percent for workers’ earnings and 18 
percent for overall inflation.3 By 2006, 
the number of uninsured had increased 
to 18 percent of the total nonelderly 
population in the United States, and 
a third of the nonelderly population 
with incomes below 200 percent of the 
federal poverty level were uninsured.4 
Health savings accounts have been 
one approach some policymakers have 
embraced to address these dual and 
growing problems of escalating costs 
of medical care and the number of 
uninsured.
While high-deductible plans have 
been available in the nongroup market 
for many years, the 2003 Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act (MMA) provided 
a generous tax incentive for certain 
individuals to seek out high-deductible 
health insurance policies with particular 
characteristics. In 2008, the minimum 
annual in-network deductibles for 
these policies were $1,100 for single 
and $2,200 for family policies (table 1). 
Annual out-of-pocket maximums for 
these plans were capped at $5,600 for 
single policies and $11,200 for family 
policies, with the limits applying only 
to the services covered in the plan. As 
the table shows, however, the average 
deductibles in HSA-compatible plans 
in the employer-sponsored insurance 
market were almost twice as high as the 
minimums. 
Tax Advantages of HSAs. Individuals 
(and families) buying HSA-qualified, 
high-deductible policies either through 
their employer or independently in the 
private nongroup insurance market 
can make tax-deductible contributions 
into an HSA. Funds deposited into the 
accounts are deducted from income 
for tax purposes, and any earnings 
on the funds accrue tax free and 
are not subject to tax or penalty as 
long as they are withdrawn to cover 
medical costs. Funds withdrawn for 
nonmedical purposes prior to age 65 are 
subject to income tax and a 10 percent 
penalty. Contributions can be made by 
employers, individuals, or both. In 2006, 
Congress removed the requirement that 
insurance options available and increase the problems 
associated with underinsurance. 
Without some type of intervention by government or •	
employers to spread health care risk more broadly, the 
most vulnerable populations (the low-income and the 
sick) are left bearing a greater burden of their health 
expenses. 
Enforcement of HSA Legal 
Requirements
If HSA funds are used for nonmedical purposes, a •	
nonelderly individual would be required to pay taxes 
on the withdrawal in addition to a 10 percent penalty. 
However, currently, there is no administrative mechanism 
in place to verify that spending from HSAs is in fact 
being used for medical purposes. This lack of verification 
creates an easy mechanism for evading taxes. 
Conclusions
HSA/HDHPs are a highly tax-advantaged savings vehicle •	
attractive to people with high incomes and those with 
low expected use of health care services. As such, they 
are unlikely to decrease significantly the number of 
uninsured, who often have low incomes and neither 
benefit significantly from the tax advantages nor have the 
assets necessary to cover the large deductibles associated 
with the plans. 
Their ability to reduce system-wide spending is very •	
limited. 
The plans have the potential to increase segmentation •	
of health care risk in private insurance markets, unless 
employers set premiums to offset the healthier selection 
into the plans or government subsidizes the higher costs 
associated with the remaining non-HSA market. 
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annual deposits into HSAs be capped at 
the level of the plan’s deductible, and 
instead provided a fixed statutory limit 
for annual contributions. In 2008, these 
limits were $2,900 for single policies 
and $5,800 for family policies. The 
Joint Committee on Taxation projected 
that the tax cost associated with HSAs 
would amount to approximately $600 
million in 2008 and would grow over 
time, amounting to $4.6 billion over the 
2007–2011 period.5
HSAs in Practice. HSAs are intended 
to encourage more cost-conscious 
spending by placing more of the health 
care financing burden on out-of-pocket 
spending by the users of services, as 
opposed to having services incorporated 
in the premium component of insurance 
coverage, which is shared equally 
across all enrollees regardless of service 
use. In the employer-sponsored health 
insurance market (ESI), average in-
network deductibles for employees 
enrolled in high-deductible/HSA plans 
are substantially higher than the IRS 
minimum for HSA-qualifying high-
deductible health plans (HDHPs). 
Average deductibles in high-deductible/
HSA ESI plans in 2007 (inflated to 
2008 dollars) were $2,040 for single 
policies and $4,120 for family policies. 
Maximum annual out-of-pocket liability 
for the average high-deductible/HSA 
ESI plans were about three-fifths of the 
maximums set by IRS statute for single 
and family policies.
Roughly half of those with HSA-
compatible, high-deductible policies 
do not open HSAs, despite the 
tax advantages of doing so.6 Two-
thirds of employers offering single 
coverage through high-deductible/
HSA combinations report making 
no contribution to the HSAs of their 
workers.7 As a consequence, low-income 
or high health-care-need workers with 
no choice of coverage but a high-
deductible/HSA plan are likely to be 
exposed to much larger out-of-pocket 
financial burdens than they would 
be under a comprehensive policy, 
since employers are not, by and large, 
offsetting these higher deductibles with 
cash contributions to HSAs. 
Variable HSA Contributions by 
Employers. Regulations enacted under 
the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 
2006 allow employers to voluntarily 
make larger HSA contributions for their 
lower-income workers than for their 
higher-income workers, and in 2007, 
the Bush administration proposed 
allowing larger employer contributions 
to HSAs of employees who are 
chronically ill or who have a spouse 
or dependent who is chronically ill.8 
However, presented with the option 
of making varying contributions to 
HSAs as a function of worker income 
or health status, employers are highly 
unlikely to do so. If, as economists 
recognize, workers accept lower wages 
in return for compensation in the form 
of health care benefits, the minimum 
wage will limit the extent to which 
an employer can pass back larger HSA 
contribution amounts to lower-wage 
workers. And, if an employer does not 
or cannot pass back the costs of higher 
HSA contributions to their workers, 
making such additional contributions 
would be equivalent to increasing 
compensation for low-wage workers 
relative to high-wage workers. Shifting 
compensation from higher- to lower- 
income workers would not be desirable 
from an employer’s perspective unless 
the workers’ relative productivity had 
changed as well. Lower-wage workers 
are presumably contributing less value 
to the firm’s production (otherwise they 
would be paid more) and they also tend 
to have less firm-specific human capital, 
making turnover among these workers 
less costly to the firm. 
As to the proposals to allow higher 
employer contributions for those with 
chronic conditions, it is doubtful that 
an employer would offer a benefit 
specifically tailored to attract workers 
with higher medical expenditures. 
Such workers will tend to be less 
productive, due to absenteeism and 
other limitations, than will healthier 
workers, and their medical costs would 
drive up aggregate compensation costs 
for the firm.9
What Makes HSAs 
Attractive?
As a consequence of the structure of 
the tax subsidy and the shift of health 
care spending to out-of-pocket costs, 
these accounts are most attractive to 
high-income people and those with 
low expected health care expenses. 
As income and marginal tax rates 
Table 1.  IRS Statute for High-Deductible/HSA Plans and HDHP/HSA Plan Averages in the ESI Market, 2008
In-network  
deductible
Maximum annual  
out-of-pocket liability
Maximum annual  
HSA contributions
Single Family Single Family Single Family
IRS Statute for High-deductible/HSA plans, 
2008
> $1,100 > $2,200 < $5,600 < $11,200 $2,900 $5,800 
HDHP/HSA Plan Averages in the ESI  
Market, Inflated to 2008 Dollars
$2,040 $4,120 $3,279 $6,902 n/a n/a
Sources: Department of the Treasury, “Health Savings Accounts,” 2007; Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research and Education Trust, Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Benefits, 2007.  
n/a = not applicable
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increase, the value of the tax exemption 
associated with contributions to HSAs 
and the interest, dividends, and capital 
gains earned on HSA balances grows 
as well. So the tax subsidy provided for 
HSA participants is greatest for those in 
the highest marginal tax bracket and is 
of little or no value to those who do not 
owe income tax. 
While HSAs thus have some financial 
advantages for the high-income, the 
uninsured tend to be low income and 
are therefore unlikely to accrue such 
benefits. Clemans-Cope10 demonstrates 
that 70 percent of the nonelderly 
uninsured have family incomes below 
200 percent of the federal poverty level, 
and that only 16 percent of uninsured 
adults fall into the 20 percent or greater 
marginal tax bracket. A $5,800 HSA 
contribution, the maximum permitted 
under the law, would generate a tax 
reduction of $2,030 to a household in 
the top income tax bracket. The value 
of the tax benefit would be less than 
half as much for a moderate-income 
family. And it would be worth much 
less if the family could not afford to 
contribute very much into the account. 
For those whose incomes are so low 
that they have no income tax liability, 
the subsidy is worth nothing. However, 
HSA contributions made by an employer, 
as opposed to by an individual, will 
decrease even a low-income worker’s 
payroll tax liability, resulting in a 
modest tax savings.
Higher-income individuals are also 
better able to cover the costs of a 
high deductible, should significant 
medical expenses be incurred. Jacobs 
and Claxton showed that uninsured 
households have substantially lower 
assets than do the insured.11 As a 
consequence, high-deductible policies 
are unlikely to provide the uninsured 
with sufficient financial access to 
medical care in the event of illness  
or injury.
Additionally, those who do not expect 
to have much in the way of health 
expenses will be attracted to HSAs 
by the ability to accrue funds tax free 
that they can use for a broad array of 
health-related expenses that are not 
reimbursable by insurance (e.g., non-
prescription medications, eyeglasses, 
some cosmetic surgery). Those without 
substantial health care needs may also 
be attracted to HSAs because they can 
be effectively used as an additional 
IRA. For those who have already made 
the annual maximum tax-advantaged 
contributions to their IRAs or other 
pension plans, HSAs provide an 
additional tax-advantaged savings 
vehicle; HSAs’ accrued balances can 
be withdrawn with no penalty after 
age 65, even if the funds are spent for 
non-health-related purposes.12 Young, 
healthy individuals may even choose 
to use employer contributions to their 
HSAs for current non-health-related 
expenses, after paying a 10 percent 
penalty and income taxes on the 
funds—a perk unavailable to those 
enrolled in traditional comprehensive 
insurance plans.
These expectations have been borne 
out in the enrollment experience of 
HSAs.13 The GAO analysis found that 
the average adjusted gross income of 
HSA participants was about $139,000 
in 2005, compared with $57,000 for 
all other tax filers. They also found 
that average contributions to HSAs 
were more than double the average 
withdrawals, suggesting that HSA 
participants were not high users of 
medical services or they used these 
accounts as savings vehicles—or both.
Because most of the uninsured have 
low incomes and get little or no value 
from tax exemptions, the subsidies are 
very poorly targeted for expanding 
coverage to the population most in need 
of affordable health insurance—the low-
income and those with above average 
medical needs. In addition, the “one size 
fits all” high-deductible policy under 
the HSA legislation is flawed since, for 
example, a $2,200 deductible could 
have almost no cost-containment impact 
for a high-income family, while the same 
deductible could be financially ruinous 
for a low-income family.
The Cost-Containment 
Implications of the Health 
Care Spending Distribution
The distribution of health care spending 
is highly skewed, meaning a small 
percentage of the population accounts 
for a large share of total health care 
spending. The top 10 percent of health 
care spenders spend 64 percent of 
health care dollars, while the bottom 
50 percent of spenders account for 
only 3 percent of those dollars.14 As a 
consequence, significantly decreasing 
health care spending will require 
substantially lowering the spending 
associated with high users of medical 
services, ideally, while not decreasing 
quality of care. However, the high-
deductible/HSA plan approach is not 
well designed for lowering the spending 
of the high-cost population in a manner 
that does not negatively affect their 
health.
Effective price increases in the cost of 
care can reduce utilization in two ways: 
a decline in the amount of services per 
episode of care and a decline in the 
number of episodes of care. In other 
words, providers could guide patients 
to more cost-efficient treatment options, 
or the patient could reduce the number 
of contacts with a provider that he or 
she chooses to have. The impact of 
these changes in utilization should be 
considered for three populations:
Individuals who use relatively low •	
levels of care today; those whose total 
spending is currently below the levels 
of the high deductibles associated 
with HSA-qualified policies (group 1);
Individuals who use higher levels •	
of care; those whose total spending 
is currently above the levels of the 
high deductibles, but for whom these 
policies may decrease their utilization 
significantly, possibly to levels below 
the new deductibles (group 2);
Individuals who are very high users •	
of care; those whose total spending 
is currently well above the levels of 
the high deductibles, and for whom 
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health spending would continue 
to exceed the levels of the new 
deductibles (group 3).
Cost Saving Potential among the 
Healthy. For those in the first group 
who are generally healthy and do not 
have annual spending that exceeds the 
high deductibles associated with HSA-
compatible plans, the increased out-
of-pocket price of medical care could 
affect their use.15 Incentives to curtail 
unnecessary services are strongest 
for these individuals, since all of their 
health spending is under the deductible 
and therefore subject to the full force of 
cost-sharing. However, our analysis of 
the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
– Household Component showed that 
only 3 percent of total health care 
spending is attributable to those who 
spend below the minimum required 
deductibles.16 Consequently, there is 
little room for system-wide cost savings 
among this population since their 
spending accounts for so little of the 
overall expenditures.
Implications of Cost Savings for the 
Less Healthy. For those in the second 
and third groups who are unhealthy and 
who, with comprehensive insurance 
coverage, would spend above these 
higher deductibles, a number of 
scenarios are possible. Some individuals 
will face higher out-of-pocket maximums 
than they do today, and some, likely 
those from group 2, could reduce their 
health care use as a consequence. 
However, research has demonstrated 
that the reductions in their spending 
would occur as a result of reducing 
the number of episodes of their care, 
as opposed to reducing the cost of an 
episode once initiated.17 As noted above, 
this suggests that patients are making 
independent decisions to limit health 
service use without provider guidance. 
Such independent decisions based 
on financial considerations may have 
potentially serious consequences for 
their health and for the long-term costs 
of their care. Two studies have found 
that HSA participants were more likely to 
report missed or delayed health services 
and not filling prescriptions due to cost. 
These problems were greater for those 
with lower incomes or worse health.18
For the third group of individuals, 
significant savings are unlikely to 
materialize. Ninety-seven percent of 
total health care spending is attributable 
to those who spend more than the 
minimum HSA-compatible deductibles. 
Plus, the lion’s share (80 percent) of 
health care spending for those high-
cost users is incurred once those higher 
deductible levels are surpassed.19 Since 
any cost-saving potential of HSAs/
high-deductible plans occurs as a 
result of reducing spending below the 
deductible, they cannot be expected to 
have significant effects on the largest 
portion of total health care spending.
That is, unless the increased cost 
sharing is so much higher as to strongly 
dissuade the unhealthy from seeking 
much of the services that they would 
use if they had more comprehensive 
coverage. To compound the problem, 
there are no provisions to help these 
patients choose the services most 
important to their health. The health 
consequences for sick patients who 
forgo medical treatment could be 
extraordinarily grave, and the long-
term cost consequences of allowing 
conditions to worsen substantially 
before care is sought may offset the 
cost saving from decreasing their early 
care. In addition, the cost-containment 
potential of HSAs/HDHPs and their 
consequent implications for health 
outcomes will vary considerably by the 
income of the enrollee. While a high 
deductible may have a considerable 
impact on the decision of a moderate-
income patient to seek care, the 
same deductible may lead to no cost 
containment affect for a high-income 
patient.
Some researchers suggest modest one-
time savings of 2 to 7 percent might be 
anticipated from conversion to high-
deductible/HSA plans (presumably by 
reducing spending among the group 
2 population described above). They 
do not imply that such a change would 
have a significant impact on the rate of 
growth of medical spending20 because 
medical spending growth is driven 
largely by the increased use of, and 
intensity of, technologies and services 
for people with high health care needs.21 
So while increased cost sharing can 
lower the frequency of health care 
provider visits, it does not lower the 
costs per episode once an episode of 
care occurs. 
Promising Cost-Containment 
Strategies. Other, more promising 
avenues exist for saving costs in our 
health care system. These include 
using coordinated approaches to •	
evaluation of cost-effectiveness, 
such as using new and existing 
technologies, procedures, and 
medications with new regulatory and 
pricing strategies to target resources 
to the most cost-effective options;
increasing the use of cost-effective •	
preventive care;
developing cost-effective chronic-•	
care or high-cost case management 
strategies;
reforming payment methods and •	
developing purchasing strategies 
that promote the consistent delivery 
of care in the most efficient and 
appropriate setting;
developing administrative cost-•	
saving strategies, including 
effective information technology 
infrastructure.
While many of these avenues require 
significant upfront investment in 
infrastructure, research, analysis, or 
experimentation, they are substantially 
more likely to yield system-wide 
savings without compromising access 
to and quality of care for the high-need 
population. 
Implications of HSAs for 
the High Medical Need 
Population
The most significant premium 
savings accruing to high-deductible/
HSA plan enrollees likely occurs by 
altering the mix of individuals who 
purchase coverage of different types. 
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By providing incentives for healthy 
individuals and groups to purchase 
HSA-compatible plans, insurance risk 
pools can be further segmented by 
health status. The average medical 
costs of those purchasing the HSA 
plans will be substantially lower if 
the high-risk population is left in 
more traditional comprehensive 
plans. As the average cost of those in 
comprehensive plans increases, so 
does the premium associated with the 
coverage. In the extreme, premiums for 
comprehensive coverage may increase 
so much that maintaining that type of 
coverage is no longer financially viable. 
Thus, increasing enrollment in high-
deductible/HSA plans could decrease 
insurance options available and 
increase the problems associated with 
underinsurance.
Such a circumstance can be avoided 
in the employment context if both 
high-deductible and comprehensive 
options are offered and employers set 
premiums for each plan independent of 
the health care risk of those enrolling 
in a particular plan. In other words, 
premiums for the high-deductible/HSA 
plan could be set such that they are 
lower than the comprehensive plan, but 
only due to the difference in actuarial 
value across the plans, not due to the 
differential health care risk of those 
enrolling in each plan. In essence, each 
plan’s premium would be set as if all 
employees were enrolled in each plan. 
Then, a portion of premium collections 
for the high-deductible/HSA plan could 
be transferred to the comprehensive 
plan to subsidize premiums for that 
higher-cost group. In the nongroup 
market context, however, the transfer 
of financial support from the healthy 
to the less healthy will only occur 
through regulation or through direct 
government subsidization. 
Without some type of intervention by 
government or employers to spread 
health care risk more broadly, the 
practical effect of high-deductible/
HSA plans is that the most vulnerable 
populations (the low-income and the 
sick) are left bearing a greater burden 
of their health expenses. The extent 
to which this is a preferred societal 
outcome should be explicitly debated, 
as it is the primary impact of a move 
toward high-deductible/HSA plans. 
The Ability of Patients to 
Be Good Value Shoppers
Theoretically, placing a greater share of 
the health care financing burden on the 
individual users of health care should 
create incentives for greater price/
quality comparisons and more cost-
effective medical decisions. However, 
the ability of the patients to engage in 
such comparison shopping is extremely 
limited in the current private insurance 
context. As Ginsburg describes, 
effective comparison of services on 
price occur only in the context of 
non-emergency care, services that are 
not complex, and services that have 
consistent quality across providers.22 
Also, when providers do not bundle 
the same services together for pricing 
purposes, it is difficult for patients to 
compare prices. Moreover, effective 
comparison shopping can only be done 
after an appropriate diagnosis has been 
made. Situations that meet such criteria 
eliminate a great deal of the medical 
care within the system. In addition, 
confidentiality agreements between 
providers and insurers often prevent 
the providers from being able to give 
patients actual prices, as opposed to 
ranges that are generally not useful for 
comparison purposes. Traditionally, 
patients have relied upon their insurers 
to guide their provider decisions by 
choosing an efficient provider network 
on their behalf.
Enforcement of HSA Legal 
Requirements
As noted earlier, spending by those 
under 65 years of age out of HSA 
accounts is tax advantaged only if that 
spending is for medical purposes. If 
HSA funds are used for nonmedical 
purposes, a nonelderly individual 
would be required to pay taxes on the 
withdrawal in addition to a 10 percent 
penalty. However, currently, there is 
no administrative mechanism in place 
to verify that spending from HSAs is in 
fact being used for medical purposes. 
Unless an individual HSA participant 
is subjected to an IRS audit, there are 
no checks on the type of spending 
being done. Given that any individual’s 
likelihood of an audit is very low, this 
lack of verification creates an easy 
mechanism for evading taxes. This 
problem is amplified by the increase in 
allowable annual contributions to HSAs 
and the fact that such contributions can 
now exceed the associated insurance 
plan’s annual deductible.
Flexible spending accounts (FSAs) 
are employment-related accounts that 
allow users to deposit pretax dollars 
into accounts that can then be drawn 
down during the year to pay for medical 
expenses. The permissible medical 
expenses are defined broadly, including 
out-of-pocket costs for care that is 
or is not part of the account holder’s 
insurance policy, just like HSAs. There 
are a number of differences between 
FSAs and HSAs (e.g., unused FSA 
balances are forfeited at the end of the 
year, they do not earn income, and they 
do not require health insurance plan 
participation), but the only relevant 
difference for this discussion is that 
account administrators verify that 
withdrawals from FSAs are medical-
related expenses that comply with 
the FSA law. This is precisely the type 
of verification that could be required 
of HSA withdrawals, and would be 
under the “Taxpayer Assistance and 
Simplification Act of 2008” (H.R. 5719).23
The insurance industry complains that 
imposing such verification on HSAs 
would eliminate their cost-saving 
potential by imposing new and onerous 
administrative costs. However, the 
administrative costs of FSAs, which 
would be directly comparable with 
that of HSAs for this purpose, are 
actually very low. In fact, overall FSA 
administrative costs, which include 
payment of claims (a function that HSAs 
already perform and is included in their 
current administrative costs) as well as 
verification of the appropriateness of 
claims, are about $5.25 per member per 
month ($63 per member per year).24 
However, much of the administrative 
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tasks associated with FSAs are not 
applicable to HSAs, and the cost of 
adding adjudication of claims to the 
HSAs would be about $2 per member 
per month, according to the third-party 
administrator of such plans that we 
contacted. If an additional cost of $24 
per member would substantially reduce 
or eliminate the cost savings associated 
with HSAs, as some contend, then that 
is clear evidence that there is currently 
little to no cost savings associated with 
participating in those plans today.
Such an increment to administrative 
costs associated with these plans is 
clearly a very small price to pay to 
ensure that the law is being complied 
with and individuals are not using HSAs 
merely as a personal tax dodge.
Conclusion
HSA/HDHPs are a highly tax-advantaged 
savings vehicle that is attractive to 
people with high incomes and those 
with low expected use of health care 
services. As such, they are unlikely to 
decrease significantly the number of 
uninsured, who often have low incomes 
and neither benefit significantly from 
the tax advantages nor have the assets 
necessary to cover the large deductibles 
associated with the plans. Their ability 
to reduce system-wide spending is 
also very limited. The plans have the 
potential to increase segmentation of 
health care risk in private insurance 
markets, unless employers set premiums 
to offset the healthier selection into 
the plans or the government subsidizes 
the higher costs associated with the 
remaining non-HSA market. 
To date, HSAs have been less popular 
than their advocates envisioned, 
making up only about 2 percent of the 
health insurance market.25 Thus, their 
potentially negative ramifications on 
populations with high medical needs 
have probably been limited. However, 
efforts to expand enrollment in these 
plans through further tax incentives, 
for example, could place growing 
financial burdens on those least able to 
absorb them, leading to more barriers to 
medical care for the low-income and the 
sick and fewer insurance options. 
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